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ABSTRACT

Conflict resolution efforts of nearly seventy years between the
Negev Bedouin and the State of Israel tend to focus on the main issue
of disagreement—land ownership and its proof. 1 Yet, beyond legal
aspects of ownership, historical narratives, and culturally different
values attached to land are used and manipulated in this conflict by
direct and indirect players. Territorial conflict often lasts longer than
the material benefits seem to merit due to added issues of identity and
attachment, which develop over time. 2 Therefore, the legal lens is
limited in addressing this complex: historic, political, social, economic,
cultural, and ethnic conflict. Inter-cultural engagement between a
modern state and a semi-nomadic people challenge the prospects of
conflict resolution. This is similarly challenged in other contexts of the
Middle East, Australia, Canada, and the United States. Political and
ideological aspects, along with the factor of time, have further
entrenched the regional Arab-Israeli conflict. These factors have
increased the toll on the entire Negev population and environment—
especially on the Bedouin population.
The narrative of indigeneity is a recent strategy in this conflict,
linking the Bedouin struggle with that of First Peoples, Aboriginals, and
Native Americans. 3 This context widens the narrow legal discourse
currently employed in Israel regarding Bedouin land rights. However,
the narrative of indigeneity has not been helpful in resolving this
conflict. This context also contributes to prospects of comparative
research. As the overall context of the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict
unfolds, the question of Bedouin indigeneity can also polarize and
politicize the conflict—distancing the parties from urgent pragmatic
compromises. Therefore, linking the narrative of indigenous people

1. See Shaul Krakover, Urban settlement program and land dispute resolution:
The State of Israel versus the Negev Bedouin, 47 GEOJ OURNAL, 551, 551-52 (1999),
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007004021598 (last visited Oct. 29, 2018).
2. See Ron E. Hassner, The Path to Intractability: Time and the Entrenchment
of
Territorial
Disputes 31
INT’L
SECURITY,
107,
138
(2006), http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137509 (last visited Oct. 29, 2018).
3. See Havatzelet Yahel, Ruth Kark & Seth J. Frantzman, Negev Bedouin and
Indigenous People: A Comparative Review, in SOCIETIES, SOC. INEQUALITIES AND
MARGINALIZATION: MARGINAL REGIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 1 (Raghubir Chand
et al. eds., 2017).
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worldwide is unlikely a productive strategy in addressing the conflict
of Bedouin land rights.
INTRODUCTION
The Bedouin are Israeli citizens of an ethnic minority within the
larger Palestinian-Arab minority. Bedouin life and culture have
transitioned from pastoralism to agriculture over hundreds of years,
adapting to changing economic, political, and social circumstances. 4
Contemporary aspects of Bedouin society—settlement, education,
family, and work patterns—reflect both these external and internal
forces. These societal aspects form the context for the legal-social
conflict between the Bedouin and the State of Israel over land rights
and ownership.
Conflicts and disputes can be viewed as separate processes, divided
by the question of perceived negotiability. 5 Disputes can be escalated
to the level of conflict and entrenched through a variety of mechanisms.
Paradoxically, the quest for justice may pose formidable barriers to
conflict resolution. As the gap between positions grows, expecting a
just solution for either parties’ claims entrenches conflicting narratives
and reduces the likelihood for pragmatism and compromise. 6 The
passing of time increases group territorial identity and attachment
through multiple mechanisms and thus furthers conflict entrenchment. 7
Third party involvement is another factor, which could empower the
parties to resist compromise, potentially reducing prospects for conflict
resolution. 8

4. See John Shoup, Nomads in Jordan and Syria: Cultural Survival Quarterly
Magazine (Mar. 1984), https://culturalsurvival.org/publications/ cultural-survivalquarterly/nomads-jordan-and-syria.html.
5. See generally John Burton and Frank Dukes, CONFLICT: PRACTICES IN
MGMT., SETTLEMENT & RESOL. 5-6 (1990).
6. See Yehudith Auerbach et al., Barriers to Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict, 406 JERUSALEM INST. FOR ISRAEL STUD. 15, 71-72 (2010).
7. See Ron E. Hassner, The Path to Intractability: Time and the Entrenchment
of Territorial Disputes, 31 INT’L SECURITY 107, 109 (Winter 2006-2007),
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137509 (last visited Oct. 29, 2018).
8. Patrick Regan, Third Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate
Conflicts, 3, 23-24 (2002) http://www.jstor.org/stable/3176239 (last visited Oct. 29,
2018).
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These three factors: perceptions of justice, the passing of time, and
third-party involvement, establish the territorial dispute between Israel
and its Negev Bedouin citizens. This article analyzes the evolution of
the territorial dispute between the Negev Bedouin and the State of
Israel, and its escalation to an entrenched social-political conflict. This
conflict extends beyond questions of the legal right of land ownership
and dominates its discourse and portrayal.
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE NEGEV BEDOUIN
The Negev semi-arid desert stretches over 13,000 square
kilometers, or 4,700 square miles, and encompasses nearly sixty percent
of Israel’s territory. 9 The Negev outlines Israel’s borders with Egypt’s
Sinai desert to the south, the Gaza strip to the southwest, and Jordan’s
Arava Valley to the southeast. The Negev’s northern border extends
from an area near Gaza on the Mediterranean coast to the shores of the
Dead Sea.
The Bedouin geographic origins are in the desert and semi-desert
regions of the Arabian Peninsula. 10 Contemporary Bedouin tribes live
in North Africa, Iraq, and the Levant. 11 Historically, the Bedouin
engaged in: nomadic herding of goats and camels, light seasonal
agriculture, taxation of caravans, and tributes collected from nonBedouin settlements. 12 Their lifestyle as nomadic people depended on
water conditions and year-round pastoral land and evolved as these
resources became scarce. 13
Under the Byzantine Empire, permanent settlements of farmers and
traders along the Negev’s northern semi-arid regions served as a frontline defense against southern Nabatean tribes. 14 Incoming migration of
Bedouin tribes seeking expanses for livestock cultivation transformed
9. Negev
Desert
Region,
Israel,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/place/Negev.
10. See generally id.
11. Bedouin People, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
topic/Bedouin.
12. See id.
13. See Yahel et al., supra note 3, at 14.
14. See Rehav Rubin, The Romanization of the Negev, Israel: geographical and
cultural changes in the desert frontier in late antiquity, 23 J. HIST. GEOGRAPHY 267,
270-71 (1997).
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the Negev’s population and economic organization, during the seventh
century, and the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries. 15 Nomadic life
eliminated permanent settlements, including Beer Sheva. 16
Clinton Bailey’s early anthropological study of the Negev Bedouin
found that, as nomads, Bedouin have lived in the Negev desert for
hundreds of years. 17 Bailey cites Bedouin oral tradition, which
describes the continuous migration of tribes displacing older ones.18
Although these oral traditions portray migration patterns and land
arrangements, they are unreliable as historical sources to date and map
the Negev Bedouin’s arrival and landholdings. 19 Bailey found that early
thirteenth and fourteenth century sources name major Bedouin tribes of
the Negev and Sinai, but these tribes are not found in these areas
today. 20 Yet, a German explorer by the name of Ulrich Jasper Seetzen,
in 1807, compiled a list of tribes showing “all the major groups present
at that time were already there by the early nineteenth century. . . .” 21
During the sixteenth through twentieth centuries, under Ottoman
rule, the Negev Bedouin population significantly increased with the
incoming of nomadic Bedouins and fellahin from Egypt, as well as
slaves, or abid, from Sudan. 22 Farmers, or fellahin, are a recognized
sub-population of Bedouins who joined the Bedouin over the years as
land tenants. 23 Rather than “true” Arab Bedouin, the fellahin are viewed

15. A. Allan Degen, Traditional livestock production among Bedouin in the
Negev Desert, in INT’L HANDBOOK RES. ON INDIGENOUS ENTREPRENEURSHIP 115,
117 (Léo-Paul Dana & Robert B. Anderson eds., 2007). Islamic conquests contributed
to this migration in the seventh century, and the Mamluk rule during the thirteenth to
sixteenth centuries.
16. Id. at 117-18.
17. See generally Clinton Bailey, Dating the Arrival of the Bedouin Tribes in
Sinai and the Negev, 28 J. ECON. AND SOC. HIST. ORIENT 20, 46-49 (1985).
18. Id. at 24.
19. Id. at 25.
20. Id. at 22. For historical context, the Crusades occurred during the thirteenth
and fourteenth centuries.
21. Id. at 2.
22. A. Allan Degen, Traditional livestock production among Bedouin in the
Negev Desert, in INT’L HANDBOOK OF RES. ON INDIGENOUS ENTREPRENEURSHIP 117
(Léo-Paul Dana & Robert B. Anderson eds., 2007).
23. Id. Fellahin originated from different areas in Gaza, Egypt, and Jordan.
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as socially and culturally subordinate within Bedouin society, carrying
out much of the agricultural and other perceived menial labors. 24
II. BEDOUIN SEMI-NOMADISM AND THE QUESTION OF LAND
A. Bedouin Life Until the Nineteenth Century
East Asian historiography has romanticized the Bedouin as
remaining untouched and unchanged by the outside world until the last
decades: a “world without time” reflecting the unchanging desert
culture. 25 However, this perception of nomadism does not fully
represent the nature of Bedouin life. Nomadism is also a means of
adapting to political and military circumstances, more than merely
adapting to environmental and economic ones. 26 Populations maintain
nomadic patterns in order to benefit from political and economic
advantages. Therefore, over the past hundreds of years, the changing
circumstances in the Middle East have affected patterns of Bedouin
life. 27 Those continuous Bedouin adaptation patterns were affected by
coercive circumstances and economically motivated political
opportunities.
Until the nineteenth century, the Bedouin lived mainly as nomads
with only few permanent settlements or structures, excluding
cemeteries. Pure traditional Bedouin nomadic way of life began to
evolve in the nineteenth century with increased privatization of
Bedouin land and diverse employment reflecting Ottoman and Zionist

24. Gideon M. Kressel et al., Changes in the Land Usage by the Negev Bedouin
Since the Mid-19th Century, 28-30 NOMADIC PEOPLES (1991).
25. Kurt Goering, Israel and the Bedouin of the Negev, 9 J. PALESTINE STUD. 3
(1979).
26. William Irons, Nomadism as a Political Adaptation: The Case of the Yomut
Turkmen, 1 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 635 (1974).
27. See generally id. at 635-36. Over the past hundreds of years, the Bedouin
have been under Ottoman, British, and Israeli regimes.
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influences. 28 Technological development of new transportation options
and regional infrastructure reinforced these trends. 29
B. Bedouin Life in the Twentieth Century
Despite the Negev Bedouin’s prevailing image of nomads and
shepherds, in the early twentieth century most Negev Bedouin lived a
semi-nomadic life—defined as movement within a twelve to thirteenkilometer radius, based on extended periods of settlement and
agriculture. 30 This evolution of traditional lifestyle became the basis
for the development of an intricate internal-social system of land
ownership, grazing rights, and water access. 31 Another expression of
lifestyle adaptation was the ongoing reciprocal relations between the
Bedouin and urban centers. 32 Beer Sheva drew in three of the major
Negev Bedouin meta-tribes to settle, benefitting from development and
employment opportunities. 33
Nomads largely view land as a commons—serving all, but owned
by none. Adapting to semi-nomadic and sedentary lifestyle, with
increasing exposure to Western culture, facilitates the development of
a more direct, tribal, and personal claim to land as a source of wealth
and marker of identity. Parallel to deepening settling trends, Falah
traces Bedouin oral knowledge of a developing internal social system
of land ownership, grazing rights, and water access. 34 However, these

28. See generally Israel Finkelstein & Avi Perevolotsky, Processes of
Sedentarization and Nomadization in the History of Sinai and the Negev, BULL. OF
THE AM. SCHS. OF ORIENTAL RES. 67, 77; see Kressel, supra note 26.
29. See generally Mohamed Awad, Settlement of nomadic and semi-nomadic
tribal groups in the Middle East, 79 INT’L LAB. REV. 25-56 (1959). The Suez Canal
is one example of a technological development of new transportation options.
30. Ghazi Falah, Israeli State Policy towards Bedouin Sedentarization in
the Negev, 18 J. PALESTINE STUD. 71, 79 (1989).
31. See generally id. at 81-88.
32. See Emanuel Marx, The Political Economy of Middle Eastern and North
African Pastoral Nomads, in NOMADIC SOCIETIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH
AFRICA: ENTERING THE 21ST CENTURY, 78, 81, 86 (Dawn Chatty ed., 2005).
33. See Ruth Kark & Seth J. Frantzman, The Negev: Land, Settlement, the
Bedouin and Ottoman and British Policy 1871–1948, 39 BRIT. J. MIDDLE E. STUD.
53, 56, 58 (2012).
34. See generally Falah, supra note 31, at 81-88.
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changes were largely unaccompanied by actual registration of land
ownership.
C. Land Policy and its Effect on Bedouin Life
In the nineteenth century, the Ottomans developed a robust policy
to consolidate control and administration of their empire. 35 Under
the Tanzimat reforms, the Ottoman Land Law of 1858 instituted an
unprecedented land registration process designed to facilitate law and
order as well as boost the empire’s tax base. 36 Few Bedouin opted to
register their lands due to their under-appreciation of written
documentation of land ownership, as well as their preference to avoid
taxes. 37 Therefore, this law classified much of Bedouin territory in the
Negev as mewat—state-owned dead or not economically viable land. 38
In 1927, a British report still described the Bedouin as the “untamed
denizens of the Arabian deserts.” 39 However, during the British
Mandate rule, the price of livestock, especially camels, dropped, further
reducing Bedouin income from this traditional occupation and
deepening the trend towards permanent settlement, agriculture, and
alternative livelihoods. The cultural change deepened as the British
established the first formal schools for the Bedouin. 40
Widening and deepening of sedentary trends, together with
increasing exposure to British and Jewish lifestyle and commerce,
accelerated Bedouin transition to a monetary economy with a demand
for new market products. 41 New employment opportunities especially
benefited the Bedouin fellahin, and land tenants, as a means of

35. See Religions – Islam: Ottoman Empire (1301-1922), BBC,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/history/ottomanempire_1.shtml, (last
updated Sept. 4, 2009).
36. Knowpia, Bedouin, http://www.knowpia.com/pages/Bedouin (last visited
Nov. 11, 2018).
37. Kark & Frantzman, supra note 33.
38. Kark & Frantzman, supra note 33, at 55.
39. Martin Ira Glassner, The Bedouin of Southern Sinai Under Israeli
Administration, 64 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 31, 36 (1974).
40. Ismael Abu Saad, Towards an Understanding of Minority Education
in Israel: The Case of the Bedouin Arabs of the Negev, 27 COMP. EDUC. 235, 236
(1991).
41. See generally Marx, supra note 32, at 86.
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loosening their social and economic subordinating ties to the Bedouins,
thus decreasing the phenomenon of land tenancy. 42
Moreover, the Bedouin lifestyle and traditional land arrangements
continued to challenge British Mandate authorities, laws, and
bureaucracy. 43 This is reflected in the British Land Order of 1921,
which stipulated that anyone who cultivated mewat land had to register
the land within two months to claim ownership. 44 Again, Bedouin did
not take advantage of this opportunity, reflecting their traditional
perceptions of land, ignorance regarding the significance of British
bureaucracy, and preference to avoid paying taxes.
III. ISRAEL AND THE NEGEV BEDOUIN
During the 1948 War of Independence and the military rule
imposed on Israeli Arabs in 1951, about 80,000 of the estimated 90,000
Negev Bedouin fled or were evicted, although many eventually
returned. 45 Israeli authorities transferred two-thirds of the remaining
Bedouin into the Siyag—a closed reservation under military
supervision east of Beer Sheva, encompassing just 10% of the original
size of Bedouin land. 46 Legal restrictions such as the Black Goat Law
of 1950, prohibited the grazing of goats outside recognized land
holdings in the name of preventing land erosion. 47 Conditions in this
demarcated, closed, and isolated area are reminiscent of the native
reservations in the United States. 48
The Negev was seen by Israel as an integral part of the country and
needed frontier for future Jewish immigrant settlement and
42. See Gideon M. Kressel et al., Changes in the Land Usage by the Negev
Bedouin Since the Mid-19th Century. The Intra-Tribal Perspective, 28 NOMADIC
PEOPLES 28, 28 (1991).
43. See Kark & Frantzman, supra note 33, at 77.
44. See Ahmad Amara, The Negev land question: between denial and
recognition, Vol. XLII, No. 4 J. PALESTINE STUD. 27, 33 (Summer 2013).
45. Deborah F. Shmueli & Rassem Khamaisi, Bedouin Communities in the
Negev, 77.2 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 109, 111 (Apr. 2011).
46. Chanina Porat, Israel’s Policy on the Bedouin Issue and Left-Wing
Alternatives, 1953-1960, 10 IYYUNIM BITKUMAT ISRAEL 420, 421 (2000) (on file with
author).
47. See Shmueli & Khamaisi, supra note 45, at 110-11.
48.
SHLOMO SWIRSKI & YAEL HASSON, INVISIBLE CITIZENS: ISRAEL
GOVERNMENT POL’Y TOWARD THE NEGEV BEDOUIN 11 (2006).
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development. 49 Harsh restrictions of the Negev Bedouin reflected
historical circumstances of war, in which many Negev Bedouin aligned
with and supported Arab forces opposing Israel. 50 For these reasons
Israel perceived the Bedouin as a potential threat, warranting prevention
of Bedouin return and limiting their movement. In reality, the Negev
was a border-military zone, which was the scene of frequent military
clashes in Israel’s early years. In fact, doubts about Israel’s sovereignty
over the Negev did not cease until after the 1956 war. 51
A. Bedouin Citizenship and Land Registry
The Bedouin were granted Israeli citizenship in 1954. 52 However,
just as the Ottoman and British before, Israeli law and policy struggled
to address Bedouin civic rights, lifestyle as semi-nomads, claims to
land, and social and economic needs.
Israel’s land registry relies mainly on Ottoman land registry deeds,
or nesah tabu. 53 The 1858 Ottoman Land regulations formed the basis
for Israel’s land policy and laws—as it did for the British Mandate. 54
Most Bedouin land holdings were classified as mewat land and these
were registered as belonging to the state under both Ottoman and British
law. 55 Consequently, the Israeli “Land Law” of 1959, and Land Rights
Settlement Ordinance of 1969, nullified Ottoman laws and categorized
all mewat land as Israeli government land. 56
In the early years of the State of Israel, beyond the issue of land
holdings, a distinct cultural gap was reflected in the patronizing
attitudes and policies of the Ashkenzi—European leaders of the new
49. See Shmueli & Khamaisi, supra note 45, at 111-12.
50. See generally Havatzelet Yahel & Ruth Kark, Israel Negev Bedouin during
the 1948 War: Departure and Return, ISRAEL AFF., 21(1), 48, 61-70 (2015).
51. Porat, supra note 46 (on file with author).
52. Thabet Abu Ras, The Arab Bedouin and their Lands in the Naqab – The
Tribal Dimension of Steadfastness, 93 ADALAH’S NEWSLETTER 1, 1 (2012).
53. Ottoman Land Registration Law as a Contributing Factor in the IsraeliCONGREGATION
(2003),
http://www.beki.org/
Arab
Conflict,
BEKI
dvartorah/landlaw/.
54. See generally id.
55. See id.
56. See Yahel, H., Land Disputes Between the Negev Bedouin and Israel, 2
ISRAEL STUD., 1, 11 (2006); SWIRSKI & HASSON, supra note 48, at 13-15.
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state regarding the Bedouin population. 57 Bedouin life was perceived
as unproductive and outdated; the Bedouin as an ultimate “other” who
can be transferred and molded to serve the state’s needs. This is
reflected in a famous quote of Moshe Dayan:
We should transform the Bedouin into an urban proletariat in
industry, services, construction, and agriculture. 88% of the Israeli
population are not farmers, let the Bedouins be like them . . . . The
Bedouin would not live on his land with his herds, but would become
an urban person who comes home in the afternoon and puts his
slippers on . . . . The children will go to school with their hair
properly combed. This will be a revolution, but it will be fixed within
two generations. Without coercion but with governmental
direction . . . this phenomenon of the Bedouins will disappear. 58

Israel consistently views the semi-nomadic lifestyle as inhibiting
modern development. 59 However, behind the administrative
convenience of settling the Bedouin, Israel has long felt threatened by
Bedouin history and lifestyle due to its ramifications in terms of land
holdings and the prospects for Zionist visions of developing the
Negev. 60
B. Planned and Unrecognized Bedouin Settlements
In the 1970s and 1980s, Israel executed an urbanization policy,
declaring to modernize and benefit the Bedouin population, while
implementing the transformative vision of Moshe Dayan regarding
Bedouin lifestyle. 61 Moreover, an underlying motivation to settle the
Bedouin in townships was to put an end to Bedouin claims of land
57. See Harry Oster & Karl Skorecki, The population genetics of the Jewish
people, 132 HUM. GENETICS 119, 119-20 (2012).
58. See Jillian Kestler-D’Amours, Peddling the Myth of the Bedouin ‘Takeover,’ Haaretz (July 1, 2013), https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-jilliankestler-myth-of-the-bedouin-take-over-1.5289626.
59. Kark & Frantzman, supra note 33, at 77.
60. See generally Talia Berman-Kishony, Bedouin urbanization legal policies
in Israel and Jordan: similar goals, contrasting strategies, 17 TRANSNAT’L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS., 393, 393-94 (2008).
61. See generally Thabet Abu Ras, The Arab-Bedouin Population in the Negev:
Transformation in an Era of Urbanization, in The Arab-Bedouin population in the
Negev 67, 99 (Maya Popper ed., 2012).
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ownership rights. After 1948, the Bedouin land ownership rights, over
most of the Siyag-area lands, were transferred and handed over to
Israel. 62 Seven Bedouin townships were established offering houses
and infrastructure in exchange for the renunciation of ancestral land:
Rahat, Tel-Sheva, Arara, Kseife, Hura, Laqiya, and Segev Shalom.
Significant resources were invested in these towns and Bedouin
residents were registered as owners of their subsidized houses and
specific plots of land. The seven towns offered modern services:
schools, health clinics, water, and electricity, but lacked infrastructure
for local employment and economic development. 63
The Bedouin were not included in the planning of their future
homes and communities nor were their preferences or traditional ways
of life considered in this urbanization policy, resulting in significant
inter-generational and tribal social conflict. 64 Initially, the dominant
population of the townships was the fellahin-Bedouin population, who
had fewer land claims and therefore seized the opportunities of
economic independence and release from the Bedouin. This further
decreased the towns’ attraction to non-fellahin Bedouin and inevitably
contributed to inner-Bedouin social conflict regarding prospects of
permanent settlement. 65
In 2009, 192,800 Negev Bedouin encompassed twenty-seven
percent of the Negev’s population. 66 Nearly two-thirds of the Bedouin
population eventually moved into the seven townships. 67 The
remaining third live in diaspora localities. 68 These localities are often
referred to as “unrecognized villages,” which are informal communities
not officially recognized by the government and considered illegal.69
Their illegal status stems both from their unrecognized land ownership
62. SWIRSKI & HASSON, supra note 48, at 17.
63. See Emanuel Marx & Avinoam Meir, Land, towns and planning: The Negev
Bedouin and the State of Israel 25 GEOGRAPHY RES. F., 43, 50 (2005).
64. Id. at 53.
65. See Shlomit Tamari et al., Urban tribalism: Negotiating form, function and
social milieu in Bedouin
towns, Israel, CITY, TERRITORY AND ARCHITECTURE 1, 7 (2016).
66. ARIK RUDNITZKY, THE BEDOUIN POPULATION OF THE NEGEV: SOC.,
DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECON. FACTORS 8 (Maya Popper ed., 2012).
67. Id. at 9.
68. Id. at 11.
69. Id. at 11-12.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol49/iss1/5

12

Arieli: Negev Bedouins and the State of Israel: Social Conflict and Terri
Arieli camera ready (Do Not Delete)

2018]

NEGEV BEDOUINS AND THE STATE OF ISRAEL

12/27/2018 10:36 AM

93

claims and from the classification of these village lands as agricultural,
not residential. Because these villages are considered illegal, they have
few public services or legal permanent structures.
The Bedouin of the unrecognized villages believe resisting
resettlement is a strategy to safeguard both land-claims and the Bedouin
culture and way of life. An additional incentive to remain in these
villages is the unlimited “free” land. The Bedouins perceive the land
as free because there are no building permit requirements, nor are there
municipal or national taxes. 70 Common belief among Bedouin, which
has proven to be true, is that residents of these unrecognized villages
ultimately receive higher state compensation for resettlement options—
if and when resettlement is agreed upon. 71
These unplanned and unrecognized Bedouin villages pose multiple
challenges to Israel’s executive agencies: education, health, fire, law
enforcement, and environment. Israel has not successfully overcome
the challenge of how to develop desperately needed infrastructure like
roads, schools, and clinics. 72 This infrastructure is necessary to provide
basic services to its Bedouin citizens and maintain law and safety in
their villages, which are not zoned for development and therefore have
no master plans for such infrastructure. 73 This partially explains the
notoriously high rates of Bedouin infant mortality, accidents, crime, and
irregular school attendance. 74
C. Bedouin Social Circumstances
Both unrecognized Bedouin villages and their planned townships
are classified at the lowest level of social-economic development,
suffering from poor infrastructure, few industrial areas, poor education
services, and comparatively high crime rates. Most Bedouin are
employed outside the Bedouin townships and there is a growing
Bedouin student population in Israel’s universities, especially BenGurion University of Beer Sheva. 75 However, the Bedouin are hardly

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Yahel, supra note 56, at 8.
Berman-Kishony, supra note 60, at 400.
See id.
Abu Ras, supra note 61, at 117.
Id. at 52, 87.
SWIRSKI & HASSON, supra note 48, at 17.
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integrated into the social fabric of their neighboring Jewish kibbutz,
moshav, and towns, all of whom enjoy state service provision at
significantly higher standards. 76 This estrangement is an expression of
Israel’s widespread perception of Bedouin as a distinct “other”—Arab
Muslims who until recently were primitive nomads.
The Israeli media’s frequent association of Bedouin with crime in
the Negev has exacerbated this social distance. Indeed many Israelis
believe that Bedouins have strategically constructed unrecognized
villages as a way to gain land in the ongoing Arab-Israeli territorial
conflict. However, Israeli policies further this association with
illegality by issuing nearly 700 annual demolition warrants without
nearly enough permits for legal construction. 77
IV. BEDOUIN TERRITORY CLAIMS AND CONFLICT
From 1971 to 1979, Israel initiated a land registration program
through which 3,220 Bedouins submitted claims of territorial
ownership encompassing 776,585 square dunam of Negev land. 78
However, nearly 3,000 of these claims are still open, reflecting
conflicting ownership claims regarding 571,285 square dunam of
Negev land. 79 Since the 1975 Albeck Committee, Israel implemented a
policy to encourage the Bedouin to settle and compromise territorial
claims, because of the Bedouin’s lack of legal land ownership
documentation. In recognition of the strong Bedouin attachment to
their land, Israel has offered monetary compensation, “beyond the letter
of the law.” 80 Accordingly, those Negev Bedouin who withdraw
ownership claims can be eligible for monetary compensation and land
76. See generally Jillian Kestler-D’Amours, Israel: Bedouin ‘betrayed’ by
JAZEERA,
July
31,
2016,
relocation
plan,
AL
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/07/israel-bedouin-betrayed-relocation-plan160731085348670.html. A moshav is a cooperative village, typically with eighty to a
hundred families. A kibbutz is a commune with one hundred to eight hundred
members. These are the two main forms of farm cooperatives in the region. Close to
eighty percent of the agricultural output of Israel is produced on these types of
cooperative farms.
77. See Ronen Shamir, Suspended in Space: Bedouins under the Law of Israel,
30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 246-47 (1996).
78. See SWIRSKI & HASSON, supra note 48, at 19.
79. See id.
80. Id. at 20-21.
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compensation, without need to prove their claim’s validity. 81 The land
compensation is usually between twenty and thirty percent of the full
claim—for claims of more than 400,000 square meters. 82 For the rest
of the claim, monetary compensation is offered. None of the Negev
Bedouin who pursued the legal process have been successful.
The Bedouin continue to regard approximately 600 square
kilometers of the Negev as their rightful inheritance and continuously
petition the government for its return. 83 Numerous claims committees
were established to resolve land disputes, but so far there has been no
success in bridging the gaps between the Bedouin and the Israeli
authorities. Although not all Bedouin claim land ownership, this issue
affects the entire discourse between the Bedouin community and the
state.
The Albeck Committee established dependence between
relinquishment of land claims and prospects of Bedouin resettlement
into government-planned localities. 84 However, the Bedouin remain the
poorest and most marginalized sector in Israel’s society as evidenced
by their education, health, and welfare. 85 This policy results in a
problematic link between the land dispute and Bedouin welfare—
especially in the unrecognized villages—due to lack of government
investment in basic infrastructure and services. 86
A. Israel’s Policy Change
Current Israeli policy de-links social-economic policy from land
regulation. There is no longer a demand for Bedouin to give up any
81. Id. at 21.
82. See id. at 21-22.
83. See generally Amira Hoss, Once Again, Israel Denies the Bedouin What it
Grants the Settlers, HAARETZ, July 27, 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/israelnews/.premium-once-again-israel-denies-the-bedouin-what-it-grants-the-settlers1.6317363.
84. Noa Kram, The Naqab Bedouins: Legal Struggles for Land Ownership
Rights in Israel, in INDIGENOUS INJUSTICE: HUM. RTS. L. AND BEDOUIN ARABS IN
THE NAQAB/NEGEV 147 (Ahmad Amara et al., 2012).
85. Mohammad Darawshe & Amnon Be’eri-Sulitzeanu, Introduction to THE
BEDOUIN POPULATION OF THE NEGEV III, III-IV (2012).
86. See generally Shaul Krakover, Urban settlement program and land dispute
resolution: The State of Israel versus the Negev Bedouin, 47 GEOJ OURNAL 551-61
(Jan. 1999).
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claims to ancestral land ownership in return for land and money for
settlement. 87 This was recognized as counter-productive in dealing with
expansion of the Bedouin dispersal. 88 Policies such as the Sharon Plan
allocate funding towards law enforcement rather than urban-town
settlement. 89 Thus, nine of the previously unrecognized villages were
officially recognized and incorporated into the Abu Basma Regional
Council, allowing service and infrastructure development. 90
In 2017, Israel approved a Five Year Plan and allocated 3.2 billion
Israeli New Shekel (NIS), equivalent to one billion U.S. dollars, for
investment in the neglected developmental needs of the Bedouin
population. 91 However, land claims will likely still need to be resolved
for housing development and infrastructure to proceed, because the land
in dispute often lays within or adjacent to Bedouin townships and
villages. Therefore, the Bedouin would have the power to block the
government’s plan for potential growth, unless the land claims were
settled.
B. Conflict’s Effect on Discourse
Despite the increased focus on infrastructure needs, the conflict
over land rights continues to dominate the discourse between Israel and
its Bedouin citizens. The Bedouin Regional Council of Unrecognized
Villages (RCUV) believes that recognizing eight formerly
unrecognized villages came at the cost of renouncing significant land
claims. 92 Furthermore, RCUV foresees that the remaining
unrecognized villages will become urban ghettos neglected by the
87. See generally Kram, supra note 84, at 79.
88. Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of
the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in
this context on her mission to Israel and to the Occupied Palestinian Territory (30
Jan.–12 Feb. 2012) 8 OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
HUM. RTS. (2012), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/iopt0308/iopt0308webwcover
.pdf.
89. Kram, supra note 84, at 49.
90. SHLOMO SWIRSKI & YAEL HASSON, INVISIBLE CITIZENS: ISRAEL
GOVERNMENT POL’Y TOWARD THE NEGEV BEDOUIN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 8 (2006).
91. Five Year Plan for Socioeconomic Development in the Negev Bedouin
Localities 2017-2021 (Socio-Economic Development Department et al. 2017),
http://iataskforce.org/sites/default/files/event/pdf-343.pdf.
92. SWIRSKI & HASSON, supra note 48, at 25.
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government. 93 Therefore, the RCUV demands Israel to recognize all
unrecognized villages and their land claims. 94
Israel increasingly penalizes Bedouin of the unrecognized villages
to counter any benefits of refusing resettlement and to protect its
perceived state-land rights. These penalties—state-led legal counterclaims, house demolitions, and crop destruction—have intensified the
Bedouin resistance and their mistrust of the Israeli government, police,
and justice system. 95 Another result of Israel’s penalties has led to
political and religious radicalization of the Bedouin, reflected in: the
Islamic movement’s rapid growth, frequent protests, and decreasing
numbers of Bedouin volunteers enlisting in the Israeli army.
This territorial dispute has significant social manifestations and
ramifications. Within Israeli society, Bedouin of unrecognized villages
are often portrayed as squatters, who illegally use land without
limitations of bureaucracy, building permits, or taxation. Bedouin of
unrecognized villages essentially intimidate official state
representatives, including the police, from enforcing law. There is
growing public demand within both Jewish and Bedouin populations
for equal enforcement of law and planning regulations on all citizens—
including the Bedouin.
Support and encouragement for remaining in the unrecognized
villages comes both from inside and outside the Bedouin community.
Activists and non-governmental organizations empower Bedouin
unrecognized and illegal settlements, sharing the belief that these
settlements are justified and the authorities should accept the Bedouin
demand to remain and retain their land ownership. Others essentially
link this territorial dispute to the wider Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A
relatively recent trend is the self-identification of Bedouins as
Palestinians, despite documented historic rivalries between the two

93. Jana Van Breckel, Reclaiming spatial justice for the native Naqab Arab
Bedouin: Towards a critical geography of the Israeli land and planning laws (2016).
The Israeli government’s neglect of these unrecognized villages manifest itself
through limited borders that are inadequate for future growth, and with only minimal
state investment in long denied services and infrastructure.
94. See Maha Qupty, Bedouin Unrecognized Villages of the Negev, HABITAT
INT’L COALITION (Jan. 1, 2004), http://www.hic-gs.org/ document.php?pid=2670.
95. Berman-Kishony, supra note 60, at 402-03.
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groups. 96 In this vein, “the Naqab Palestinian Bedouin [] have shown
the tenacity typical of the Palestinian people to withstand efforts to
remove them from their land . . . .” 97 In this discourse, Israel is depicted
as a colonial power that displaces indigenous peoples—both Bedouin
and Palestinians. 98
V. BEDOUIN AS INDIGENOUS PEOPLE
A cornerstone of indigenous peoples’ claims to land is their right to
use and/or own their traditional territories. Different definitions of
indigeneity offer a mix of objective criteria, such as historical
continuity, as well as subjective ones, such as self-definition. 99 Three
features are common to most perceptions of indigeneity: “(i) indigenous
peoples are descendants of the original inhabitants of territories since
colonised [sic] by foreigners . . . ; (ii) they have distinct cultures, which
set them apart from the dominant society; and (iii) they have a strong
sense of self-identity.” 100
Bedouin self-identity is unique—a Palestinian community of
Arabic-speaking people, with a unique dialect, and roots in the Negev
stemming over a millennium. “Some demographers have concluded
that most of the Bedouin migrated into the Negev from the Sinai Desert
in the course of [the last] 250 years (i.e., [between the] 16th-19th
Centuries, . . . )” 101 hence weakening Bedouin claims for recognition as
indigenous to Israel. The Ottoman Empire’s tax records of the 16th
century show that tribes living in the Negev, at the time, “are not those

96. Havatzelet Yahel, Ruth Kark & Seth J. Frantzman, Negev Bedouin and
Indigenous People: A Comparative Review in SOCIETIES, SOC. INEQUALITIES AND
MARGINALIZATION: MARGINAL REGIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 20 (Raghubir Chand
et al. eds., 2017).
97. INT’L WORK GRP. FOR INDIGENOUS AFFS, THE INDIGENOUS WORLD 2009,
427 (Kathrin Wessendorf ed., Apr. 2009).
98. See ALEXANDRE KEDAR, ET AL., EMPTIED LANDS: A LEGAL GEOGRAPHY
OF BEDOUIN RTS. IN THE NEGEV 8-9 (Stanford University Press 2018).
99. See id. at 159.
100. Jérémie Gilbert, Nomadic Territories: A Human Rights Approach to
Nomadic Peoples’ Land Rights. 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 681, 694 (2007).
101. ADA KATSAP & FREDERICK L. SILVERMAN, ETHNOMATHEMATICS OF
NEGEV BEDOUINS’ EXISTENCE IN FORMS, SYMBOLS, AND GEOMETRIC PATTERNS 19
(2016).
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residing there today.” 102 Thus, the contemporary Bedouin population of
Israel has relatively recent tenure and attachment rather than historic
ownership rights to Negev land, based on 200 to 300 years of tenure
and settlement. In Israel, the relatively recent introduction of the claim
of indigenousness is usually accompanied by the presentation of the
Bedouin as a dispossessed people. 103 This developing discourse
demonstrates Hassner’s insight regarding the effect of the passing of
time in unresolved conflict. Time affects territorial conflict materially
by clarifying the boundaries of the disputed territory and symbolically
by strengthening the social perception of the territory’s integrity and
value. 104
Indigenous claims are usually accompanied by the accusation of
dispossession. To present the Bedouin as a dispossessed people,
activists and their supporters make two main claims: (1) the Negev
belonged to the Bedouin for centuries before the founding of Israel; and
(2) the Ottoman Empire and the British Mandate, as the historical rulers,
both recognized Bedouin traditional historic ownership of Negev land.
According to this accusation, Israel chooses to ignore these legal rights,
effectively dispossessing the land’s indigenous population in favor of
Zionist ideals and settlement. 105
The indigeneity of the Bedouin has been met with a certain amount
of international success, gaining official recognition from United
Nations’ institutions and the European Union. Both entities have
effectively made declarations claiming that the Israeli Bedouin deserve
the defense of international law regarding the rights of indigenous
peoples.
In July 2012, for example, the European
Parliament called ”for the protection of the Bedouin communities of the
West Bank and in the Negev, and for their rights to be fully respected
by the Israeli authorities, and condemns any violations.” 106 These
violations include house demolitions, forced displacements, and public
102. Yahel, Kark & Frantzman, supra note 96, at 14.
103. See, e.g., id. at 1, 11, 12.
104. Ron E. Hassner, The Path to Intractability: Time and the Entrenchment of
Territorial Disputes, INT’L SECURITY, 107-38 (Winter 2006-2007),
https://www.jstor.org/stable/4137509.
105. See generally ALEXANDRE KEDAR ET AL., EMPTIED LANDS: A LEGAL
GEOGRAPHY OF BEDOUIN RTS. IN THE NEGEV (2018).
106.
2013
O.J.
(C
349E)
87
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2013:349E:FULL&from=EN.
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service limitations. 107 The European Parliament also called on the
Israeli government to withdraw the Prawer Plan, the 2011 Bill on the
Arrangement of Bedouin Settlement in the Negev. 108 The Prawer Plan
combines economic development and integration of the Negev Bedouin
with the resolution of their land claims, recognizing and expanding
some unrecognized villages and relocating approximately 40,000
Bedouin to existing, recognized local councils. 109
However, the claim of indigeneity works both ways. As opposed
to the view of Israel as a colonial state, Zionist ideology—through
which the State of Israel was founded and settled— views the Jewish
people as indigenous to the Land of Israel. This ideology is based on
ancient Jewish settlement and kingdoms, continuous Jewish presence
in the land, and religious attachment. Foreign intervention on behalf of
the Bedouin is perceived as a political tactic, which uses the Bedouin
for the wider Arab-Israeli conflict. This foreign intervention disregards
specific context and legalities to weaken the historic and moral basis of
the State of Israel. Thus, many Western states are perceived as
hypocritical for insisting on the rule of law and contemporary treatment
of indigenous peoples and minorities, in comparison to many Western
states’ own colonial histories.
CONCLUSION
Bedouin life and culture have transitioned from pastoralism to
agriculture over hundreds of years, influenced by gradual adaptation to
changing economic and social circumstances as well as by political
107. Id.
108. Jack Khoury, European Parliament Condemns Israel’s Policy Toward
(July
8,
2012,
4:43
PM),
Bedouin
Population,
HAARETZ
https://www.haaretz.com/european-parliament-condemns-israel-s-bedouin-policy1.5265139; Jillian Kestler-D’Amours, Israel’s Bedouin Battle Displacement, AL
JAZEERA (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/08/
2013828125945288209.html.
109. See The Bill on the Arrangement of Bedouin Settlement in the Negev
(“Prawer-Begin Plan”), INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE ON ISRAELI ARAB ISSUES (July
2013),
http://iataskforce.org/sites/default/files/resource/resource-1058.pdf;
see
Martin Michaels, Homeless In Their Own Land: 40,000 Bedouin Face Forced
NEWS
(June
27,
2013),
Relocation
In
Israel,
MINTPRESS
https://www.mintpressnews.com/homeless-in-their-own-land-40000-bedouin-faceforced-relocation-in-israel/164414/.
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coercion. 110 Trends in Bedouin society—settlement, education, family,
and work patterns—reflect both these external and internal forces.
Cultural, social, and legal disparities linger when lifestyles evolve and
are often a basis for conflict—as in the case of the Bedouin and the State
of Israel.
The question of indigeneity is a central historic-ideological debate.
However, the question of Bedouin indigeneity polarizes and politicizes
this conflict, distancing the parties from urgent pragmatic compromises.
Heightened political conflict is known to produce polarization at the
extremes, 111 yet this can be enough to divert the mainstream discourse
from pragmatic compromise to hardened positions. One certain thing
we can learn from the context of indigeneity in countries such as
Canada and Australia is that indigenous people may win territorial
disputes, but the territory alone is not enough to improve their socialeconomic prospects. 112 An integrated effort combining the resolution
of territorial disputes with government planning and investment in
infrastructure, services, and social integration is needed to fix inequities
that have developed over decades.
Berman-Kishony adds a regional dimension to this debate,
recommending that Israel learn from Jordan in addressing this complex
conflict. 113 Despite the different circumstances, Jordan and Israel share
ambitions of modern and Western-oriented urbanization and
development. These Western-oriented ambitions are often viewed as
110. See generally Gideon M. Kressel et al., Changes in the Land Usage by the
Negev Bedouin Since the Mid-19th Century, 28 NOMADIC PEOPLES 28-55 (1991); see
Seth J. Frantzman & Ruth Kark, Bedouin Settlement in Late Ottoman and British
Mandatory Palestine: Influence on the Cultural and Environmental Landscape, 18701948, NEW MIDDLE EASTERN STUD. (New Middle Eastern Studies, June 15, 2011),
http://www.brismes.ac.uk/nmes/wpcontent/uploads/2011/06/NMES2011FrantzmanKark.pdf.
111. María José Hierro & Aina Gallego, Identities in Between: Political
Conflict and Ethnonational Identities in Multicultural States, 62 J. CONFLICT RESOL.,
1314, 1332 (2018).
112. See Francis Mitrou et al. Gaps in Indigenous Disadvantage Not Closing:
A Census Cohort Study of Social Determinants of Health in Australia, Canada, and
New Zealand from 1981-2006, BMC PUB. HEALTH (Feb. 2014),
https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1471-2458-14-20.
113. Talia Berman-Kishony, Bedouin Urbanization Legal Policies in Israel
and Jordan: Similar Goals, Contrasting Strategies, 17 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS., 393-412 (2008).
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incompatible with local Bedouin lifestyle and traditions, specifically
traditions regarding land-holdings.
Jordan has been relatively
successful in balancing Bedouin ambitions of retaining traditional
cultural and political forms, as well as the right of the state to regulate
the allocation of land and to pursue economic development. 114 The
comparison with Jordan, an Arab state of Bedouin origin, illustrates the
extent at which politics, ideology, and ethnicity are entwined in this
territorial conflict in Israel. Due to this sensitive and pragmatic conflict,
a resolution needs to derive from an interest-based dialogue, rather than
on penalties and politicization.

114.

Id.
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